University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

1962

The Early Evolution of the Common Law Writs: A
Sketch
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
UC Hastings College of the Law, hazardg@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Early Evolution of the Common Law Writs: A Sketch, 6 Am. J. Legal Hist. 114 (1962).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/951

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Hazard, Jr.

Geoffrey

Author:

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.

Source:

American Journal of Legal History

Citation:

6 Am. J. Legal Hist. 114 (1962).

Title:

The Early Evolution of the Common Law Writs: A Sketch

Originally published in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY. This article is reprinted with
permission from AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY and James E. Beasley School of Law
of Temple University.

The Early Evolution of the Common Law
Writs: A Sketch*
by GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.t

LLIAM'S CONQUEST OF ENGLAND in 1066 and the years
following witnessed the superimposition of Norman
feudal institutions on Anglo-Saxon royal and communal institutions and the subsequent emergence of a royal administrative and judicial system that was stronger than either of its
predecessors and, indeed, perhaps the strongest in Europe.
Very broadly, the Anglo-Saxon political structure was a decentralized association of communities, having origin in
familial and tribal groups, dominated in varying degrees by
local magnates of varying power, and presided over by a King
with vague -and generally feeble authority. For present purposes, the significant Anglo-Saxon institutions at the time of
the conquest were the crown and the local tribunals. The
crown, threoretically at least, had a responsibility to see that
justice was done throughout the realm, i.e., had a direct legitimate interest in all disputes between man and man. The English crown also carried with its fiscal perquisites (most importantly, crown lands productive of income and the power
to lay and collect national taxes) and the nucleus of an administrative organization. In point of fact, the rule of the
English kings was mild and at times feeble. The stronger
dynasty of William I, however, found in the power of justice
and the power of the purse the means by which to rule with
a firmer hand.
The other important English institution was the local
tribunal. There were two principal kinds, the hundred courts
(village-centered courts) and the shire courts (analogous to
the county court). Communal forums, these courts by the
* This and the following article were papers read at the annual
meeting of the West Coast Branch of the American Society for Legal

History held at the School of Law, University of California, Berkeley,
on September 30, 1961. The third paper read on this program, by Prof.
Thomas G. Barnes, will appear in the next issue.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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time of the conquest had assumed a territorial jurisdiction in
the sense that they were recognized as the appropriate tribunals of disposition of controversies arising in the territory
in which they were located. The precise nature of their operations is still a matter of conjecture and debate, but several
points seem clear. Both performed without differentiation functions that we would today call "administrative," such as ferreting out thieves, and "judicial"-determining who were the
guilty. Both acted under at least nominal supervision of the
crown, thus representing in theory at least the implementation
of the royal interest in justice. The principal shortcoming of
the local tribunals was that they were slow and uncertain in
operation. Another shortcoming was that the common modes
of trial were trial by ordeal and trial by compurgation. An
important attraction was that in some cases they relied on the
recognition as a means of ascertaining facts. A recognition
was the act by which a group from the vicinage came together
and stated on oath, that is "recognized," the facts of the
matter in issue, e.g., that A had owned certain cattle and that
B, the accused, had taken them away. The recognition was
one of the important roots of the common-law jury system.
Furthermore, the court itself consisted of "suitors to court,"
presided over (in the shire court) by the sheriff. The suitors
were the men of substance of the vicinage and attendance at
court was an obligation of their status as such. The presence
of suitors preserved the element of lay judging, also a tradition
supporting jury trial. Whether the suitors and the recognitors
were the same people, and, if not, what the relation between
them may have been, is -as yet undiscovered.
On top of this indigenous English institutional structure
the invaders of 1066 erected the para-military feudal system.
In theory and practice, it differed radically from the AngloSaxon institutions. The feudal hierarchy was a pyramid of
power built on land grants descending in the first instance
from William to his tenants-in-chief, from the tenants-in-chief
to their feudal subordinates, and from these subordinates
to the petty lords of the manor. Each member of the hiera'chy
held tenure in land and in status by grant from his immediate
superior. The grant carried with it the burden of rendering
services, principally that of providing mounted armed warriors
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-knights-to the grantee's superior, and the benefit of the
superior's protection. It also carried with it the obligation of
"suit of court," i.e., the duty to attend and participate in judgment in the feudal court held by the lord. Theoretically, and
for the most part practically, each member of the hierarchy
had complete authority and responsibility in respect to those
holding from him, subject, however, to his responsibility to
his own immediate superior. The lord's authority and responsibility included the power and duty to hold his feudal court and
to render justice for his tenants. A peculiarity of the feudal
courts, which came in time to be regarded as a serious shortcoming, was that they determined some issues by trial by
battle as well as by the ordeal.
The jurisdictional lines between the Norman feudal courts
and the English communal courts were various and uncertain.
Suffice it to say that the feudal courts at one level or another
of the hierarchy theoretically had jurisdiction over every kind
of dispute that might arise between man and man, save for
those between tenants of different lords. At the same time, the
communal courts, nominally acting in the name of the king,
had a very similar jurisdiction. In theory and practice, therefore, both king, acting through local courts, and lords, acting
through feudal courts, had jurisdiction of any particular case.
This unstable duality could not and did not last. Powerful
lords swallowed up the hundred courts. And royal justice in
time superseded the feudal courts and intruded upon the
local courts. The history of the common law is the account of
the royal supercession of the feudal and local courts.
As suggested above, the exercise of royal authority in a
dispute between man and man could be justified under the
Anglo-Saxon theory of the crown. William and his successors
held that crown. But such an exercise would also constitute an
intrusion into the feudal courts--an invasion of established
jurisdiction, a derogation of constituted authority, a supercession of constituted officials and a capture of accustomed
revenues (for running a court can be profitable, as speed-trap
towns today are aware). Political adventures of this sort have
always required caution and circumspection. Hence, assertion
of royal jurisdiction was impeded both by theoretical limitations imposed by feudalism and practical objections raised by
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the barons.' These considerations help explain the halting process by which the jurisdiction of royal authority was expanded.
The earliest forms of royal intervention were not strictly
speaking judicial but executive or administrative. The occasion
for these early interventions was a wrong, typically involving
a breach of the peace, committed somewhere in the realm and
unredressed by the local or feudal courts. For example, a landlord might assert that his tenant had not paid his feudal dues
of produce and services. On that pretext, the lord would direct
his retainers to oust the tenant and take over the land. The
tenant, if convinced that he could get no remedy in his lord's
court, would take his troubles to the king. If the case sounded
serious enough, the king might direct the landlord to rectify
2
the situation.
The instrument of intervention was the writ. The writ was
nothing more than a written directive from the king, witnessed and bearing his seal, directed to a royal official or to
an individual or group of individuals ordering the addressees
to do or refrain from doing a designated act. In the first half
of the Twelfth Century, the Anglo-Norman kings not infrequently made such peremptory intrusions to enforce the peace
of the realm which they by their coronation oath had sworn
to uphold. An example of such a writ, from the reign of Stephen
(1135-54)3 is as follows:
"Stephen, king of the English, to the bishop of Norwich, greeting. I order you to reseise the monks of St.
Edmunds of their church of Caistor as fully and justly
as they were seised on the day when their abbot left for
Rome. And if anything has since been taken away there,
1 The process of royal intrusion should not, however, be thought of
as the execution of a pre-conceived putsch. Like most constitutional
developments it was a series of ad hoc reactions which only in retrospect
could be seen as following a pattern.
2 Cf. The modern-day intervention of executive officers, such as
Presidents, governors and mayors, in disputes ordinarily cognizable
before regular public or private forums, e.g., the collective bargaining
table.
3 Reprinted and translated in VAN CAENEGEM, Royal Writs in
England from the Conquest to Glanvill 453-54 (Seld. Soc., 1959).
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let it be justly restored. And let them keep it in peace
that no injury is done of them thereof.
"Witness: Aubrey de Ver. at Westminster."
This method of executive intervention afforded a swift
and effective remedy but it also was easily abused. The writ
issued upon the complaint of the alleged injured party: if he
had misrepresented the facts, royal intervention would work
not justice but injustice. The crown's desire to provide swift
redress for wrong was tempered by its desire to be assured
that wrong in fact had been done, an age-old dilemma in the
administration of justice. In the Twelfth Century, this dilemma was solved in two different ways, both of which, however, resulted in bringing the case before royal officials. One
method directed the sheriff, or some other official, to advise
himself of the facts before proceeding to act. At first, the
writs were silent on how the sheriff was to advise himself, but
before long reliance was placed on recognition by men of the
vicinage, i.e., a jury. An example of a writ of Henry II, issued
sometime between 1155 and 1166, is this one :4
"Henry, King of the English and duke of the Normans and of the Aquitanians and count of the Angevins,
to the sheriff of Lincolnshire, greeting. I order that you
have recognized without delay by the oath of lawful citizens of Lincoln whether the canons of Lincoln were seised
of the land near the water of the city, which Martellus
gave them, on the year and day when Henry, my grandfather, was alive and dead and if they were disseised afterwards unjustly and without judgment, then I order that
they be reseised thereof without delay and justly and let
them hold it well and in peace and justly and freely and
quietly and honourably. And let them not be impleaded
thereon until I come back to England, except on my command. And unless you do it, my justice shall.
"Witness: Manasser Biset, steward, at Tinchbrai."
By the other method, the alleged wrongdoer was ordered
to right the wrong or to appear before the king or his justices
and show cause why he had not done so. At the show cause
4 From

VAN

CAENEGEM, op.

cit. supra note 3, at 462.
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hearing the merits of the case would be determined. This form
of writ was known as a "praecipe,"' from the Latin word for
"order" appearing first after the greeting in the writ. An
example, 5 is the following:
"The king to the sheriff, greeting. Order N. to give
back justly and without delay to R. a hundred marks
which he owes him, so he says, and of which he complains
that he deforces him unjustly. And if he does not do it,
summon him by good summoners that he be before me or
my justices at Westminster a fortnight after the octave
of Easter to show why he has not done it. And have there
with you the summoners and this writ.
"Witness: N. At M."
By this evolution, a writ which was originally an extraordinary executive interference with the normal course of
feudal or local procedure became an ordinary judicial function
of the crown.
There was, however, another parallel development which
must be mentioned. This was the Norman, as distinct from
Anglo-Saxon, device of the inquest. The inquest was brought
to England with the conquest. It was an inquiry conducted by
commissioned royal officials asking the people of a neighborhood what they knew about designated matters. The Domesday Book, the vast inventory of England taken at the direction of William I in 1086, was compiled from information
gathered at a general royal inquest made for the purpose. In
the years after Domesday, inquests were made from time to
time upon special direction issuing from the king to his justices. Henry II, upon succeeding to the throne in 1154 after
the disorderly rule of Stephen, determined to bring peace and
order to the realm and in particular to rectify the wave of
violent ousters that had occurred during the Anarchy. To this
end in about 1166 he commissioned his justices to travel about
the realm and hold inquests to determine what ousters"disseisins"-had occurred in recent years. This was the origin
of the assize of novel disseisin, the term "assize" referring
variously and ambiguously to the order directing the inquiry,
to the inquiry itself, and to the findings upon the inquiry. At
5 From VAN CAENEGEM, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 437.
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these inquests, men from the vicinage were called before the
justices and required to state what recent disseisins had taken
place, a procedure which, like the Anglo-Saxon recognition,
place reliance on local talesmen for ascertainment of the facts.
The responses given at inquest, for example that A had
within recent years unjustly disseised B of a certain manor
in the shire, served as the basis for corrective orders in the
form of writs from the king to the wrongdoer. The inquest
was thus a quasi-criminal investigation aimed at restoring
order, but resulting also in a private remedy for the injured
party. Beyond its practical effectiveness, the assize of novel
disseisin had the advantage that the right in the land in quest
was established by testimony, rather than the traditional trial
by battle, ordeal, or compurgation. Its popularity led Henry
to send out subsequent commissioners of inquest and in rapid
order it became available on request by any aggrieved person.
i.e., it had become an ordinary private remedy available in
king's court rather than an extraordinary remedy for restoration of the public peace. It reached this stage of development
by the end of the reign of Henry II, about 1185. The procedure
was invoked of course by writ, such as this one: 6
"The king to the sheriff, greeting. N. has complained
to me that R. has disseised him unjustly and without judgment of his free tenement in such a vill after my last
crossing to Normandy. And therefore I command you
that, if the said N. gives you security for prosecuting
his suit, you shall cause that tenement to be reseised of
the chattels that were taken in it and the tenement with
the chattels to be in peace till the Sunday after Easter.
And in the meantime cause twelve free and lawful men of
the vicinity to see that land and have their names put
down in writing. And summon them by good summoners
that they be then before me or my justices prepared to
make recognition thereof. And put the said R. under gage
and safe pledges-or his bailiffs in case he himself is not
found-that he be there then to hear that recognition.
And have there the summoners and this writ.
"Witness: M. At W."
6 From VAN CAENEGEM, Op. cit. 8upra note 3, at 464.
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Reflection on the foregoing discussion suggests the following generalizations:
1. The royal writs represented interferences with established feudal or local jurisdiction. In a real sense, in their
genesis they were extraordinary remedies. This fostered a
tradition that they were to be strictly construed in their application, i.e., that if a particular case was not within the
terms of the writ the action founded on the writ would fail.
This in part at least explains the tradition of technicality
found in common law procedure, a tradition that has not completely died even to this day.
2. The royal writs were ad hoc responses to particular
types of situations. Even when the number and variety of
writs had so increased that one was available for most all
types of cases, the tradition remained that a royal court acted
not in exercise of a general power to do justice in cases brought
before it, but in exercise of a special power conferred by the
issuance and return of the writ. This phenomenon not only
fostered the technicality referred to but also perpetuated a
compartmentalization of the substantive law: Substantive law
emerged in the form of pronouncements about the rights of
the parties brought before a court in a writ proceeding.7 This
peculiarity was, of course, the basis for Maitland's classic
dictum that "forms of action we have buried, but they still
rule us from their graves." 8
3. The writs were in the first instance executive directives. The method by which the propriety of their issuance
was determined was in substance that by which any executive
establishes his premises for action: such inquiry as the responsible officer deems sufficient to satisfy himself that action
is necessary and appropriate. The evolution of writ procedure
is the story of its judicialization, in which executive self7 This compartmentalization is, of course, still felt today. See, e.g.,
the provisions of statutes of limitations differentiating between the time
bar on "an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake," e.g.,
Calif. Code Civ. Pro. §338, subdiv. 4, and the time bar on "an action
upon a . . . liability not founded upon an instrument in writing," e.g.,
Calif. Code Pro. §339, subdiv. 1, even though a "liability" not founded
upon an "instrument" (such as the liability to repay money wrongfully
received) may arise as the result of "ifraud."
8 MAITLAND, Equity and the Forms of Action, 296 (1909).

HeinOnline -- 6 Am. J. Legal Hist. 121 1962

122

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. 6

satisfaction was displaced as the foundation for official action
by the procedures of notice and hearing that are characteristic
of adjudicatory process. Certainly one consequence of that
displacement was the effacing of the chief original attractions
of writ procedure, namely its speed and its decisiveness. The
inference is that these attractions became dispensable as the
crown strengthened its hand during the Twelfth Century, so
that the relatively higher certainty of obtaining an enforceable decision was compensation for additional delay and difficulty in obtaining it. The further inference is that writ procedure slowed its pace for the same reasons that procedures
for deciding questions of right and wrong seem always to
have slowed: process that is "due" in such cases is process
that is slow as compared with other methods of decisionmaking. As Judge Learned Hand not long ago observed,
"Speed and hurry ought to be antipodes of judicial behavior." 9

9 California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California,Inc., 162 F.
2d 893, 903 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
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